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Foreword
Aviation accidents are one of the leading causes of occupational fatalities in Alaska. 
Pilots in Alaska die at a rate nearly 100 times the mortality rate for all U.S. workers, 
and over five times the rate for all United States pilots. Unlike the rest of the country, 
many of Alaska’s villages are not connected by a road system; commuter and air taxi 
operators serve as the main link between these villages and regional hubs, transporting 
people, cargo, and mail.
Although several federal programs have begun to address the issues surrounding 
aviation safety in Alaska, work remains to be done. This document describes a 
comprehensive survey of air-taxi operators and pilots in Alaska in which company 
and pilot demographics, flight practices, and attitudes about safety were examined. It 
provides information about current practices and how industry views potential safety 
measures, which is critical to designing effective prevention strategies.
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, as the national agency 
responsible for occupational safety and health research, is committed to continuing to 
reduce the number of fatal occupational aviation crashes in Alaska. We look forward 
to further work with government, industry, and nonprofit partners who share our 
interest in protecting American workers who fly in Alaska.
John Howard, M.D.
Director
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
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Abstract
Because aviation crashes are one of the leading causes of occupational fatalities 
in Alaska, investigators at the Alaska Field Station of the National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health contracted with the Institute of Social and Economic 
Research at the University of Alaska Anchorage to administer two statewide aviation 
safety surveys, one of air carrier operators and one of active commercial pilots. Both 
surveys addressed pilot and company demographics; number of pilot flight hours 
(total, aircraft type, and instrument hours); flying experience in Alaska; and attitudes 
about safety, flying practices, and other salient risk factors.
Surveys from 153 commuter, air taxi, and public-use operators were received at a 
79% response rate. Survey results were used to create an industry profile, compare 
operators’ responses to their pilots’ responses, and analyze and compare responses of 
operators with high fatal accident rates (designated “cases”) to operators without high 
fatal accident rates (designated “controls”). 
Results indicated that the average case pilot had less career flight experience than 
the average control pilot and worked 10 hours a week more. Case operators were less 
likely to consider pilot fatigue a problem when scheduling flights and more likely to 
depend financially on timely delivery of bypass mail. Case pilots were three times as 
likely as controls to fly daily into unknown weather conditions. Nearly 90% of the case 
pilots reported that they never flew when so fatigued that they wanted to decline the 
flight, compared to 64% of control pilots. The findings suggest that the combination of 
pilot inexperience and longer work hours and work weeks may contribute to Alaska’s 
high pilot fatality rate. Results of the operator-pilot comparisons suggest that financial 
pressures on operators may influence their views on what measures would be effective 
in preventing crashes. Many of the responses received in these surveys were consistent 
with the goals of three major, recently-implemented aviation safety programs in 
Alaska: the Medallion Foundation, the Federal Aviation Administration’s Circle of 
Safety, and Capstone.
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1Air Transportation Safety in Alaska
In 1999, the U.S. Congress funded the implementation of a federal initiative—the 
Alaska Interagency Aviation Safety Initiative—to reduce aviation-related injuries and 
fatalities and to promote aviation safety in cooperation with the air transportation 
industry and pilots in Alaska. This initiative is led by the National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) in partnership with three other federal 
agencies that share an interest in preventing aircraft crashes and promoting 
aviation safety. These are the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration’s National Weather Service.
This initiative complemented another, congressionally funded initiative to reduce 
aviation fatalities-the Capstone program, sponsored by the FAA. This joint 
FAA/industry effort includes installation of improved avionics in aircraft used 
in small commercial operations; improvements in ground infrastructure for 
weather information, data link communications, and flight information services; 
and development of new global positioning systems- (GPS-) based nonprecision 
instrument approaches at remote airports. 
A disproportionate number of all U.S. aircraft “accidents”a occur in Alaska. Between 
1990 and 2002, there were 434 commuter and air taxi accidents (CFR Part 135)b in 
Alaska—36% of all such accidents in the United States. The state with the next highest 
number of commuter and air taxi accidents was Florida, which had only 4% of all 
such U.S. accidents. Of the Alaska commuter accidents, 67 were fatal, resulting in 194 
deaths (21% of all U.S. commuter and air taxi aviation deaths).1
Aviation accidents are a leading cause of occupational fatalities in Alaska. Between 
1990 and 2002, aviation accidents in Alaska caused 130 occupational pilot deaths. This 
is equivalent to a rate of 385 deaths per 100,000 pilots per year, nearly 100 times the 
mortality rate for all U.S. workers (4 per 100,000 workers per year2) and over five times 
a This document uses the National Transportation Safety Board definition of “accident” for consistency 
with other publications. An accident is an “occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft 
which takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and 
until such time as all such persons have disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious 
injury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage.”
b In this document, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) refers to Title 14, Chapter I, which includes the 
Federal Aviation Administration and commercial aircraft in the United States. CFR Part 135 is also 
cited as “14CFR135” or Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Part 135.
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the rate for all U.S. pilots (70 per 100,000 workers per year). Thus, an Alaskan pilot 
would have an 11% risk of death from an aircraft accident over a 30-year career.
These statistics may reflect some of the unique features of aviation in Alaska. Although 
more than half the population lives in the state’s three major cities, many people live in 
remote villages. Commuter and air taxi operators serve as the main link between these 
villages and regional hubs, transporting people, cargo, and mail. In 1994, commuter 
airlines in Alaska served 238 locations, only five of which had road connections to the 
airline hub.3 Approximately 85% of the aircraft are single-engine. These operations are 
a vital component of the transportation system in Alaska.3
Additional unique Alaska features affecting aviation are large areas of high, 
mountainous terrain; flat, marshy tundra; and an extensive coastline. These factors at 
Alaska’s northern latitudes result in diverse climatic zones and associated weather that 
is variable and often harsh. Poor visibility and rapidly changing weather are common 
and contribute to the problems of air transportation in Alaska. Because of the high 
cost to cover such a large area, most of Alaska has been without usable infrastructure 
for instrument flight rule routes that permit low-altitude flying into small villages. 
Due to Alaska’s high accident rate, the FAA, NTSB, and other agencies have 
investigated many aspects of the regional airline industry. Most of these studies focus 
on accident report data.4-10 A few have initiated surveys of pilots3, 11-14 or audits of 
operators.15 Studies based on accident reports describe common accident profiles. 
Several common fatality scenarios were identified, including take-off and landing 
errors and flying under visual flight rules into instrument meteorological conditions 
resulting in a controlled flight into terrain. Using data from pilot surveys, some papers 
compared pilots working for operators with high numbers of controlled flight into 
terrain or take-off/landing crashes to pilots working for other operators.12, 13, 15 These 
studies led to recommendations for improved training, changing the safety culture, 
and providing better and more accessible weather information. Among the many 
changes that have occurred in Alaska was the installation of 16 remote video weather 
cameras during 1995-2000. 
With one exception (NTSB 19953), previous studies and the resulting 
recommendations have not addressed economic incentives that might put pressure on 
operators and pilots to fly in unsafe conditions. These incentives include overtime pay 
for pilots, income from bypass mail delivery, and pressure from passengers. Bypass 
mail is a federal subsidy for heavy shipments that would otherwise have to go as air 
cargo (at more expensive rates) to people and businesses in towns off the road system. 
Carriers contract with the U.S. Postal Service to deliver this mail and are required to 
deliver it by the end of the next business day after they receive it. If one carrier declines 
to deliver the mail, the task can be re-assigned to another carrier. While the U.S. Postal 
Service does allow for delays caused by bad weather, if another carrier chooses to fly 
into a given area, the mail goes to that carrier. So those who depend more on income 
from bypass mail may have more incentive to fly in marginal weather. The previous 
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studies also did not consider the possible role of positive incentives such as insurance 
rate reductions for safe operators. 
From August 2001 through January 2002, NIOSH sponsored two statewide air 
transportation safety surveys, one of Alaska commuter and air taxi operators (Appendix 
I: Operator/Small Operator Questionnaire Summary) and one of pilots (Appendix II: 
Pilot Questionnaire Summary) and contracted with the University of Alaska Anchorage, 
Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) to administer them. These surveys 
built upon previous investigations, providing an updated, in-depth survey of both pilots 
and their employers. 
The intent of the surveys, as outlined in the original documentation, was to 
accomplish four tasks:
improve estimates of the professional Alaskan pilot workforce and flight  
activity;
identify the perceptions, activities, and practices of air carrier operators and 
pilots;
recommend prevention strategies based on survey results;
provide a basis to assess and evaluate the effectiveness of future interventions.
To this end, the surveys addressed current safety practices and training, as well as 
attitudes toward regulations and potential safety measures. Information about pilot 
and operator demographics, number of pilot flight hours (total, aircraft type, and 
instrument hours), number of hours of flying experience in Alaska, management and 
pilot attitudes about safety, flying practices, and other salient risk factors was also 
collected. Results were expected to provide valuable information to those developing 
interventions for reducing the incidence of commuter and air taxi crashes.
1.
2.
3.
4.
4 Air Transportation Safety in Alaska
2.1 Questionnaire Development
To develop the questionnaires, NIOSH conducted focus groups from May through 
November of 2000 in five Alaska regions (Anchorage, Juneau, Bethel, Barrow, and 
Kotzebue). Pilots, operators, and community members participated in the focus groups. 
Themes emerging as concerns or barriers to aviation safety in Alaska were—
 (1) Inadequate weather reporting and a lack of weather-reporting equipment and 
trained weather observers. 
 (2) Limited airport, airway, and navigation infrastructure.
 (3) The very limited pool of experienced pilots in air taxi and small commuter 
operations resulting from the continuously high turnover of pilots. Once pilots 
become experienced in small operations, they typically seek and obtain jobs as 
pilots with major airlines and cargo carriers.
 (4) A need for enhanced training in local conditions and more vigilant supervision of 
less-experienced pilots.
 (5) A desire for increased support from federal regulators on safety-specific 
issues, including training and standardized interpretation and enforcement of 
regulations.
 (6) Pressures—economic, passenger, and self-induced—to continue or take off in 
adverse and deteriorating weather conditions.
The first phase was to draft two preliminary questionnaires. In designing the pilot 
questionnaire, research staff took into account respondent sensitivity to questions 
about practices that are contrary to federal aviation regulations (FAR’s). In addition 
to an understandable reluctance to admit to breaking the law, some pilots also raised 
concerns that their responses to such questions would be used for enforcement 
purposes. For these reasons, pilots were not asked questions about their employers 
that might call for explanations of practices or procedures contrary to aviation 
regulations.
The next phase was to pretest the questionnaires. Representatives from six companies 
pretested the operator questionnaire, and six pilots pretested the pilot questionnaire. 
Results from the pretest indicated which questions and terms were confusing, 
confirmed which questions were actually measuring perceptions and attitudes, 
2 Methods
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and determined the amount of time required to administer the survey. Using this 
information, the final questionnaires were constructed.
2.2 Operator Sample 
The operator survey population consisted of private companies, government agencies, 
and nonprofit organizations. Private companies which self-identified to the FAA as air 
transportation businesses carrying passengers and/or freight in Alaska as of November 
2000 with aircraft having fewer than 10 seats were included. Government agencies and 
not-for-profit organizations included in the population operated public-use aircraft in 
Alaska as of November 2000. 
ISER drew the sample from the FAA’s Vital Information System (VIS) database, which 
the FAA uses to track its regulatory and licensing actions. ISER selected all companies 
supervised by the FAA Alaska region that were certified under CFR Part 135 (commuter 
airlines and air taxis) and grouped operators both by size and geography. The sample 
included commercial operators; federal, state and local public agencies; and one 
nonprofit, noncommercial corporation (the Civil Air Patrol). The only CFR Part 91 
(general aviation) operations included in the study were those of government and 
CFR Part 135 operators flying under CFR Part 91. Lodge owners, guides, and similar 
professions were included only if they had a CFR Part 135 certificate. 
ISER grouped operators into “large” (operators employing three or more pilots) and 
“small” (operators with one or two pilots). Large operators were then grouped into a 
case group and a control group (see below) based on the estimated number of annual 
fatal accidents per pilot during the portion of the period during January 1990 to June 
2001 when the operator maintained CFR Part 135 operations in Alaska.
According to the VIS, 123 Alaska operators employed three or more pilots; 285 operators 
employed one or two pilots. Most commercial operators in Alaska employ just one or 
two pilots; however, larger operators account for the most flight hours in Alaska. To get 
information from operators and pilots having the most flight hours, as well as address the 
diversity across Alaska, ISER attempted to survey all the large operators and one-third of 
the small operators. Geographically, the FAA’s Anchorage Flight Standards District Office 
(FSDO) supervises 78% of all small operators (covering south-central and southwest Alaska) 
along with the Fairbanks and Juneau FSDO (covering interior and northern Alaska and 
southeast Alaska, respectively) supervising 11% each. To ensure geographic representation 
that captured the variations across the state in weather, terrain, remoteness of destinations, 
and aviation infrastructure, the small-operator sample was stratified by the supervising 
FSDO. A random sample of 60 small Anchorage operators (about 28%), 18 Fairbanks 
operators (56%), and 16 Juneau operators (53%) was selected (Table 1). The Fairbanks and 
Juneau regions were over-sampled relative to the Anchorage region due to the small total 
number of operators in those regions. The survey response rate for all operators was 79%. 
Company identities were kept confidential and unknown to the government employees 
involved in conducting the study.
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Table 1. Number of operators and survey response rate for large and small Alaskan commuter, air taxi 
and public aircraft companies
Large Operators Small Operators Total
Anchorage Fairbanks Juneau
Original operator sample 123 60 18 16 217
Revised operator sample 
(still in business in Alaska)
116 49 17 12 194
Nonresponses 20 9 6 6 41
Completed operator surveys 96 40 11 6 153
Operator response rate 83% 82% 65% 50% 79%
2.3 Pilot Sample 
The pilot survey targeted pilots currently employed by operators responding to the 
operator survey. The pilot sample was generated from interviews with the air carrier 
operators. Pilots were randomly selected from the large companies which participated 
and agreed to let their pilots be surveyed. ISER asked the company to provide 
sampling data and contact information for their pilots in one of the following ways: 
Most preferred: The company provides names and contact information for a 
complete list of their pilots so that ISER could contact the pilots directly;
Next most preferred: The company provides a list of pilot names from which to 
draw a sample and would distribute survey forms to the selected pilots; and
Least preferred: The company follows instructions on how to draw a sample of 
their pilots and then distributes survey forms to the selected pilots.
For small companies, the pilot sample was identical to the operator sample, that is, 
operators were also pilots. For small operators, the operator and pilot questionnaires 
were combined into one document and duplicate questions were eliminated. 
Combining the questionnaires reduced costs and the time burden on the small-
operator respondent by obtaining both operator and pilot information in one contact. 
Because of discrete sampling of pilots, the actual sampling fraction varied by the size 
of the operator. The maximum sampling fraction was 40% (two pilots in a five-pilot 
company), the minimum sampling fraction was 22%, and the average was 25% overall. 
Of the 88 large operators which allowed pilots to receive surveys, 75 companies 
(85%) had at least one pilot complete a survey. A total of 204 individual pilot surveys 
were completed from the possible sample of 295 pilots working for large operators, a 
response rate of 69%.
A consent form was sent with the questionnaires advising respondents of the confidentiality 
of the information they were providing. It also included information on the authority and 
purpose for data collection and told respondents that their participation was voluntary, 
that responses would not be used in enforcement actions against them, and that the survey 
results would be made available to the air carrier operator and pilot associations, federal 
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agencies, and other interested parties in a summary format only, without any personal or 
corporate identifiers. 
ISER interviewed operators from August 2001 through January 2002 and pilots from 
December 2001 through February 2002. Surveys were mailed to all selected companies 
and followed up by telephone and fax as necessary. In cases when telephone contact 
was unsuccessful or when the operators preferred, interviewers completed the 
interview in person. 
2.4 Survey Representativeness
Because the survey was stratified, the results needed to be weighted to properly represent 
the characteristics and attitudes of Alaska CFR Part 135 operators as a whole. Since the 
population numbers from the VIS database included operators no longer in business 
in Alaska, ISER first calculated adjusted population numbers. VIS totals were adjusted 
based on the numbers of sampled companies that had changed strata or gone out of 
business. The resulting estimates of operators in each stratum (Anchorage, Fairbanks and 
Juneau) are not integers (Table 2). To calculate weights, ISER divided the total number of 
small operators in each stratum by the number of completed interviews in that stratum. 
Each completed interview in Anchorage represents over four operators, each interview 
in Fairbanks represents 2.59 operators, and each interview in Juneau represents 3.75 
operators.
Table 2. Weighting small operator survey data to represent all small 
operators
Anchorage Fairbanks Juneau
Total estimated small operators 178.4 28.4 22.5
Total completed surveys 40 11 6
Weight 4.46 2.59* 3.75
* Actual calculation 28.444/11 = 2.585
Pilot weights were calculated by dividing operator weights by the fraction of pilots 
interviewed. A separate pilot weight was calculated for each company. For a technical 
discussion of weighting in this study, refer to Conway et al., 2004.16
Possible response bias was assessed using variables for which information existed for 
nonrespondents as well as respondents. Available test variables included company size, 
location, and number of accidents. Lack of information on unscheduled flight hours 
precluded tests for a bias in the accident rate, especially for small operators for whom 
unscheduled activities make up a large fraction of operations. A proxy for accident 
rate was calculated by dividing the number of accidents between January 1990 and 
June 2001 by the number of pilots reported in the VIS. No significant relationship was 
found between this rough accident rate and whether operators were willing to complete 
the survey. Likewise, size and location were not associated with a greater likelihood of 
response or refusal/noncontact. Although Juneau’s response was lower than in other 
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areas, the total number of small operators in Juneau was too small for the lower rate to 
be statistically significant.
2.5 Data Analysis
In accordance with the intent of the survey instrument, the survey data were used 
to: create estimates of numbers of pilots and flight activity, identify characteristics 
of operators and their pilots, and perform comparative analyses to identify possible 
prevention strategies.
2.5.1 Estimates of pilots and flight activity
Estimates of the number of pilots working for commuter, air taxi, and public agency 
operators in Alaska were derived from questions in the operator survey about the total 
number of pilots employed, and the total flight hours. Questions about pilot numbers 
were specific to season, while the flight hours included all those flown during 2000. 
Estimates and the corresponding 95% confidence intervals were calculated using the 
stratified sampling weights (Table 2) based upon sampling theory (for example see 
Thompson 199217).
To estimate the total number of pilots employed in Alaska, Alaska Department of Labor 
(AKDOL) data were used to obtain the number of pilots working for companies that 
had not been included in the sampling frame. AKDOL data, drawn from unemployment 
insurance records, include all pilots who work for companies that employ 20 or more 
people (total, not just pilots) in Alaska. What CFR Part governs a pilot is not relevant to 
their inclusion in AKDOL data. It was, however, key to selecting the appropriate sample 
for the survey. 
The survey focused on air operators flying under CFR Part 135 and public agencies. 
As a result, some pilots were counted in one data source, some in the other, some 
in both, and a few in neither. For example, this survey did not include pilots flying 
exclusively for large airlines (Alaska Airlines, Northwest Airlines; CFR Part 121). 
ISER, as the contractor, was able to view the company names, match the survey data 
with the AKDOL data, and identify pilots not included in the survey. The estimated 
total number of CFR Part 135 pilots employed during the peak summer season was 
combined with the pilots described in AKDOL who had been excluded from the 
original survey.
2.5.2 Characteristics of operators and their pilots
Survey results about operator and pilot characteristics were summarized either by 
reporting the percentage responding positively (for example, percentage holding an 
instrument license), or by the average value (mean) of all responses (for example, the 
average number of years of each pilot’s flight career). The median, or value such that 
half the values are larger and half the values are smaller, was also presented for results 
on pilot flight experience. If the mean and median are similar in value, then none of 
the responses were substantially higher or lower than the average. If they differ, then 
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some of the responses were very different than the rest and the median is a better 
representation of the majority of responses.
The stratified sample meant that ISER staff spoke to almost all the larger operators in 
the state, but only about one in five of the smallest operators. To reflect the aviation 
community more accurately, the small operator results were weighted to account for 
the same two-thirds of all operators in the weighted sample that they represent in the 
total population. Not all operators or pilots surveyed answered all the questions and 
results represent the average or percentage of all the answers received.
2.5.3 Comparative analyses
Survey results were compared in two ways, one in which responses of large operators 
were compared to the average response of their pilots to ascertain similarities and 
differences (particularly with respect to attitudes and beliefs), and one in which 
responses of operators and pilots of companies having high rates of fatal crashes 
(designated “cases”) were compared to responses of operators and pilots of companies 
not having high fatal crash rates (designated “controls”). Both analyses were restricted 
to survey responses from only the large operators.
In the first analysis, survey responses of large operators and their pilots were 
summarized. Questions about attitudes, beliefs, and preferences had been designed 
with Likert scale responses. For example, the possible answers to a question about risk 
reductions measures were: “very effective”, “somewhat effective”, and “not effective”. 
While one could in principle compare qualitative responses directly, we chose instead 
to compare means of ordinally scaled variables. The principal reason for comparing 
means is to obtain a clear indicator of the direction of response differences. For 
example, group responses for a question on perceived effectiveness might show that 
50% of the respondents perceived that a measure was not effective at all (0 on the 
Likert scale) and 50% perceived the measure as very effective (3 on the scale). These 
values would be a significant difference in a chi-square test from a group where all 
respondents perceived that the measure was somewhat effective (2 on the scale), but it 
would not show a clear direction for the difference.
Statistical tests were conducted at the operator level to examine differences between 
operators’ responses and the average response of their pilots in paired sample tests. 
Paired tests take into account the potential similarity of views between operators and 
the pilots they have hired. A significance level of 0.05 was established for the difference 
of means tests (t-tests). As a result of the large number of tests performed, the overall 
or experiment-wise error rate will be higher than 0.05, and a few tests could be 
significant due to chance. As with most surveys, it is the pattern of results that may be 
most meaningful. Since many of the questions on the same subject had to be worded 
differently for pilots and operators in order to make sense in different contexts, these 
statistical tests address differences in questions that are related but not identical. Only 
the responses of operators and pilots from large operations were analyzed since the 
pilots of small operations were speaking for the company as well as themselves, often 
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because they were the sole pilot, so logically there was no difference between small 
operators and the pilots working for small operators.
In the second analysis, data on large operators were used to understand if practices 
and attitudes differed between operators with a higher number of fatal crashes than 
expected (cases) and the rest of the operators (controls). Fatal accident data were 
gathered using the publicly available NTSB Aviation Accident Database. Companies 
that had been in business longer and had more exposure were expected to have had 
more fatal accidents. An operator was classified as a case if their crash rate was higher 
than the expected number of fatal crashes given the number of pilots employed. A 
probability of 0.30 was used to divide cases and controls.  An operator fell into the 
case group if there was less than a 30% probability of  observing the operator’s number 
of fatal crashes compared to the expected number.  The expected number of fatal 
crashes assumes that the underlying crash rate was the same as the average Alaska 
operator. Small operators were excluded from this analysis because they generally had 
insufficient flight activity to determine reliable crash rates, and pilots were assigned 
based on their employers’ crash rates. For a detailed discussion of case and control 
assignment, refer to Conway et al., 2005.18 Differences between cases and controls 
among pilots in terms of their responses to survey questions were analyzed using 
Pearson chi-square(c2) and difference of means tests (t-tests) with a 0.05 significance 
level.
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3.1 Workforce and Flight Activity
Information for sampling was based on the number of pilots reported as employed 
in the November 2000 VIS database; for analysis, the operators were classified based 
on their responses to the question, “How many pilots do you currently employ?” A 
few companies fell into one category based on the VIS, but the other in their survey 
answer (Table 3). Survey answers were assumed to be more up-to-date than the 
information available in the VIS, and so all analyses were based upon the number of 
pilots reported on the survey. Fourteen companies sampled as large were analyzed as 
small; three companies sampled as small were analyzed as large.
Table 3. Comparison of large and small operator classifications using 
the FAA Vital Information System to create the sample, and survey 
data to establish groups for analysis
Classification according to VIS (sample)
Large Small Total
Classification according 
to survey (analysis)
Large 82 3 85
Small 14 54 68
Total 96 57 153
The survey asked how many pilots each company typically employed in the fall, 
winter, spring, and summer seasons. Based on responses, an estimate of statewide 
employment at the time of the survey as well as seasonal employment was generated. 
The employment numbers at the time of the survey largely reflected fall employment, 
since the interview dates ranged from August 2001 to January 2002. Employment was 
highest in summer and lowest in winter (Table 4). Estimates of employment by CFR 
Part 135 operators and public agencies ranged from 1,426 pilots in winter to 1,907 in 
summer. The number of pilots employed by individual companies ranged from 1 to 
105. Over half of all companies employed only one pilot, and two-thirds employed 
only one or two pilots; only 10% employed 10 or more pilots. About 95% of the pilots 
were employed by the one-third of the companies that had more than two pilots. The 
average number of pilots employed by companies was 1.7 pilots in 1999, 1.9 in 2000, 
and 1.8 in 2001. Survey data indicate that in 2000, Alaska CFR Part 135 and public 
agency operators statewide flew an estimated total of 420,000 scheduled flight hours 
(95% CI: 275,000-565,000) and 415,000 unscheduled flight hours (95% CI: 370,000-
460,000).
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Table 4. Estimated number and 95% confidence interval of pilots employed by 
Alaska-based CFR Part 135 operators and public agencies
Lower 95% CI limit Estimate Upper 95% CI limit
Employed at time of survey 1,671 1,856 2,041
Summer employment 1,731 1,907 2,116
Winter employment 1,247 1,426 1,631
The final estimate of all pilots employed in Alaska during the peak season, 
incorporating the numbers of pilots flying for other types of aviation operators from 
the AKDOL, was 2,742 (95% CI: 2,551-2,932). This estimate excluded people who 
flew for companies that were both very small and not regulated under CFR Part 135. 
Typical examples are fish spotters, pilots providing “incidental transportation” for 
lodges under CFR Part 91, and some flight instructors. 
3.2 Characteristics of Operators and Their Pilots
A higher percentage of large operators surveyed had formal programs to implement 
risk reduction measures, including training and supervision measures than small 
operators surveyed (Table 5). Eight of the large operators also had CFR Part 121 
certificates, while none of the small operators did. Nearly all companies permitted 
pilots to cancel flights. However, only 30% of the large operators and 19% of the small 
operators required higher than the minimum regulatory weather conditions for flying, 
and only 12% of the large operators and 4% of the small operators had a written list of 
launch conditions.
Table 5. Characteristics of large and small Alaskan commuter, air taxi, and public agency operators
Large operators Small operators
Number of respondents 85 68
Operator characteristics
Mean flight hours 2000 5,507 766
Median flight hours 2000 2,739 500
Mean percentage increase in insurance costs in past 18 months 39 15
Median percentage increase in insurance costs 20 15
Percentage of operators who pay pilots overtime 33 0
Risk reduction measures in place (%)
Higher-than-FAA weather minimums required 30 19
Whiteout pilot training 50 16
Low-visibility pilot training 60 19
Flat-light pilot training 52 15
Recovery from IMC pilot training 66 19
Whiteout pilot check rides 42 11
Low-visibility pilot check rides 49 14
IMC = Instrument meteorological conditions.
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Table 5 (continued). Characteristics of large and small Alaskan commuter, air taxi, and public agency 
operators
Large operators Small operators
Flat-light pilot check rides 38 11 
Recovery from IMC pilot check rides 53 15
Written list of launch conditions 12 4
Pilots can cancel flights 100 99
Other employee can cancel flights 88 26
Outside person can cancel flights 18 6
IMC = Instrument meteorological conditions.
Essentially all pilots surveyed had commercial and instrument ratings (93-100%). 
These ratings are required for pilots flying for CFR Part 135 operations, but not for 
those flying for public agencies. Many pilots are more highly qualified than required; 
72% of the large operator pilots and 42% of the small operator pilots had either 
Certified Flight Instructor or Airline Transport Pilot certificates (Table 6). 
More pilots working for large operators had multiengine land ratings than did small 
operators and the reverse was true for single-engine sea ratings (Table 6). Some of 
the measures of pilot experience–flight hours, years of experience, year-round Alaska 
experience–had similar means and medians, especially among the small operators’ 
pilots. In those cases, the mean or median fairly represented the years of experience 
of many pilots, with a few having substantially more or less experience than average. 
However, median hours of instrument flight experience (Alaska and total) were well 
below the means, indicating that many pilots had few or no such hours, and a few had 
many hours. Although almost all pilots were instrument-rated, 16% had zero hours of 
instrument flight in Alaska.
Table 6. Characteristics of pilots by size of Alaskan commuter, air taxi, and public agency operators
Large operators Small operators
Number of respondents 197 64
Pilots holding various pilot certificates/privileges (%)
Commercial 96 100
Instrument 95 93
Airline transport pilot 64 35
Helicopter 18 9
Flight instructor 34 17
Pilots holding various aircraft ratings (%)
Single-engine land 86 81
Multiengine land 70 43
Single-engine sea 56 73
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Table 6 (continued). Characteristics of pilots by size of Alaskan commuter, air taxi, and public 
agency operator
Large operators Small operators
Multiengine sea 15 20
Other 18 6
Female pilots (%) 6 2
Mean age (years) 42 49
Mean number of employers (as pilot) 4.3 3.6
Average work day (duty hours/day, peak season) 12 11
Average work week (duty hours/week, peak season) 72 67
Mean Median Mean Median
Length of flight career (years) 15 13 20 20
Year-round Alaska flight experience (years) 10 6 5 6
Flight hours, total 9.408 7,034 10,918 10,006
Flight hours in last 12 months 636 600 482 400
Flight hours, Alaska 7,084 5,044 9,731 9,427
Flight hours, Alaska in last 12 months 595 600 457 400
Instrument hours, total 1,096 337 690 110
Instrument hours, Alaska 797 150 284 50
Pilots had been flying for an average of 16 years, from less than 1 year to 50 years. 
Two-thirds of the pilots working for large operators had flown year-round, rather than 
seasonally, for 1 to 40 years (mean of 9.6 years) throughout their Alaska careers. Of 
those with seasonal flight experience, the mean was 4.5 years of Alaska experience. 
Over their entire careers, pilots had worked for a mean of 4.2 companies. Pilots are 
typically male (95%); 60% are in their 30s and 40s. Most (84%) have education beyond 
a high school diploma; 45% have a bachelors or higher degree.
Most pilots appear to work long duty hours during the busy summer season (numbers 
include all work time, not just flight hours). The average reported work day and work 
week were 12 and 71 hours, respectively. Over 86% of the pilots reported that they 
worked more than 50 hours a week during the busy season.
Pilots for both large and small operators perceived their jobs as being as safe or safer 
than other jobs. When asked whether a pilot’s job was more dangerous than other 
jobs, among pilots working for large operations, 9% said much safer, 8% slightly safer, 
31% as safe, 44% slightly more dangerous, and 7% much more dangerous. Pilots for 
small operators were even more optimistic: 8% much safer, 13% slightly safer, 52% as 
safe, 21% slightly more dangerous, and 6% much more dangerous.
3.3 Accident Prevention Measures
Operators and pilots generally agreed that improved weather information, especially 
via video camera, and weather reporting by and consultation with trained weather 
observers; improved decision-making policies and skills; and regional hazards training 
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about local weather and terrain would all be effective ways to prevent crashes (Table 
7). Not much optimism was shown about improving passenger understanding of 
weather (that is, passengers bringing pressure to fly into poor weather or visibility) as a 
successful prevention strategy. Neither was there much enthusiasm expressed by any of 
the groups for changes to the current allocation and management system for bypass mail 
(commercial pilots carrying U.S. mail to remote villages).
Table 7. Percentage of operators and pilots rating various accident prevention measures as “very 
effective”
Large operator 
management
Small 
operators
Pilots for large 
operators
Weather information
More locations with staffed weather 
reporting
79 82 76
Increased accuracy of existing weather reporting 77 77 76
More locations with automated weather 
reporting
64 59 75
Increased use of weather video cameras 62 75 75
Improved passenger understanding of weather 
hazards
33 34 18
Training
Decision-making training 75 68 79
Regional hazards training 70 68 82
Whiteout/flat-light training 48 60 73
Meteorology training 36 48 55
Rewards and incentives
Financial incentives for operators with no 
accidents or incidents
50 39 23
Salary-based pay 34 28 42
Pilot rewards for flights or flight hours without 
accidents or incidents
26 23 27
Pilot experience
Better checks of a pilot’s flying history before 
hiring
42 28 20
More flight time for new pilots 39 40 41
Other
More time to deliver bypass mail 33 9 13
Written criteria for go/no-go decisions 30 31 37
Changes in how bypass mail is given to 
operators
25 10 11
3.4 Comparison of Large Operator and Pilot Responses
The responses of large operators were compared with the average responses of their 
pilots for an operator-level analysis (Table 8). Results show paired tests of the mean 
difference between operator and pilot responses within the same company.
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Table 8. Difference between large operator and pilot responses to similar questions
Survey Question
Operator-pilot 
mean*
t-statistic p-value
Attitudes toward FAA oversight
Regulations interfere with getting the job done -0.05 -0.54 0.59
Higher-than-FAA weather minimums sometimes 
needed
-0.53 -7.79  0.00†
Company provides formal pilot training
Whiteout -0.20 -2.48 0.02
Low visibility -0.18 -2.44 0.02
Flat lighting -0.17 -2.22 0.03
Recovery from IMC -0.13 -1.72 0.09
Perceived effectiveness for preventing crashes
Improvements in meteorology pilot training -0.20 -1.77 0.08
Improvements in decision-making pilot training -0.02 -0.28 0.78
Improvements in whiteout pilot training -0.20 -1.99 0.05
Improvements in regional hazards pilot training -0.13 -1.70 0.09
Better checks on pilot’s history 0.31 2.74 0.01
Better passenger understanding of weather 
hazards
0.27 2.38 0.02
Changes in the way bypass mail is given to 
operators
0.38 2.75 0.01
More time for bypass mail 0.51 3.68 0.00†
Financial incentives for operators with no 
accidents
0.54 4.35 0.00†
* Positive values indicate that on average operators agreed with the statements more than their pilots. 
Negative values indicate that on average pilots agreed with the statement more than operators.
† Indicates p-value less than 0.005.
Bold values indicate p-value ≤ 0.05.
Many pilots believed that some routes needed higher-than-FAA weather minimums 
to keep an adequate margin of safety. Pilots reported receiving training for flying 
in adverse weather conditions, but also stated that their companies have no written 
training program; that is, training programs are informal. On effectiveness questions, 
pilots generally viewed additional training to be more effective in preventing crashes 
than did operators. Companies viewed better preemployment hiring checks to be 
more effective than did pilots. These results appear to reflect the differing perspectives 
of the two parties. Pilots viewed better weather reporting as more effective, but 
differences between support for additional automated weather stations and additional 
video cameras were not significant. On the other hand, pilots were less enthusiastic 
than operators about better passenger understanding of weather hazards, changes in 
bypass mail policies, and financial incentives for safety. These are all measures that 
have a direct effect on company finances. Pilots were not as optimistic as operators 
that financial incentives for operators who did not have accidents would result in 
improvements in safety. 
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In addition to the differences analyzed, differences between operator and pilot 
perception of fatigue may exist. Among large operators, only 6% responded that 
fatigue was a major problem in scheduling, 46% responded that it was a minor 
problem, and 48% responded that it was not a problem. Pilots were asked how often 
during the peak season they would have preferred to decline a flight due to fatigue, but 
flew anyway. Among pilots for large operators, 15% had made such a decision weekly 
during the peak season, 7% monthly, 24% less than monthly, and 54% never made 
such a decision. Among small operators, the respective proportions were 13% weekly, 
zero monthly, 25% less than monthly, and 63% never. The questions about fatigue for 
operators and pilots are not strictly comparable, however, so a difference of means 
would not be a meaningful statistic.
3.5 Comparison of Operators With and Without High Fatal   
 Crash Rates
Of the 85 large operators responding to the survey, 14 were categorized as high fatal 
crash operators (cases) versus another 67 large operators (controls) (Table 9). Four 
large operators who responded to the survey did not have business status information 
available for the entire period (January 1990 to June 2001) and thus were excluded 
from this analysis. The case operators generally flew more hours than controls and 
were less likely to consider pilot fatigue a problem when scheduling flights. Case 
operators were more likely to consider on-time bypass mail delivery important to their 
financial success. Overtime pay and changes in insurance rates were not significantly 
different between the two groups. The results show no significant differences between 
the risk reduction measures undertaken by the case and control firms; however, of the 
13 listed policy risk reduction measures, only one was less common in cases.
Using information from the VIS database, ISER was able to examine the types of 
operators placed into the case and control groups. Eight operators in the control group 
held CFR Part 121 certificates as well as CFR Part 135 certificates as of June 2001, 
while none in the case group held CFR Part 121 certificates. All the public operators 
participating in the survey were in the control group. Operators in the case group 
were more likely to provide scheduled service according to their certificates (57% of 
cases versus 33% of controls), although this difference diminishes when all operators 
reporting scheduled flights in 2001 are included (57% cases versus 42% controls). 
Control operators reported having slightly more aircraft certified (under any CFR 
certificate) than case operators, although the difference was not statistically significant 
(a mean 14.4 aircraft per operator versus 13.1, t = 0.4, p>0.05). The fleet composition 
of case and control operators differed; case operators had many more of their fleet 
in single-engine land aircraft (72% of passenger aircraft reported by case operators 
versus 32% of control operator passenger aircraft) while control operators had more 
helicopters (30% of passenger aircraft reported by control operators versus 4% of case 
passenger aircraft).
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Table 9. Comparison of characteristics between operators having a high number of fatal crashes and 
other operators
High fatal 
(cases)
Other 
(controls)
Significance 
(t or c2)
Sample size 14 67
Operator characteristics
Mean flight hours, 2000 8,468 5,577 0.04
Mean increase in insurance costs past 18 months (%) 40 35 0.80
Pay pilots overtime (%) 29 32 0.81
Pilot fatigue not a scheduling problem (%) 71 42 0.05
On-time mail delivery important to financial success 85 53 0.04
Risk reduction measures in place (%)
Higher-than-FAA weather minimums required 29 29 0.99
Whiteout pilot training 71 45 0.07
Low-visibility pilot training 71 59 0.37
Flat-light pilot training 69 48 0.16
Recovery from IMC pilot training 71 62 0.49
Whiteout pilot check rides 50 42 0.59
Low-visibility pilot check rides 57 50 0.63
Flat-light pilot check rides 46 39 0.64
Recovery from IMC pilot check rides 57 50 0.63
Written list of launch conditions 14 12 0.81
Pilots have ability to cancel flights 100 100 1.00
Other employees can cancel flights 100 91 0.24
Outside person can cancel flights 14 23 0.48
Bold values indicate p-value ≤ 0.05.
Although few differences appeared between case and control operator survey 
responses, responses from pilots revealed significant differences in operations 
(Table 10). No pilot respondents employed by case operators and only seven pilot 
respondents of the control operators were female. The small number of female pilots 
overall resulted in low statistical power for testing gender effect differences between 
the groups. Pilots flying for case operators had one-third fewer years of flying 
experience, approximately half as many instrument hours overall, and half as many 
instrument hours in Alaska. On average, pilots flying for case operators had half as 
many hours with their current employer as control pilots. On the other hand, case 
pilots had worked significantly more hours in the past 12 months than other pilots, 
suggesting they were flying more hours in their current jobs. 
Differences in responses to questions about working conditions confirmed the 
differences in working conditions between pilots of case and pilots of control 
operators. Case pilots worked more hours per day and more days per week on average 
than controls. Pilots of case operators worked nearly 13 hours per day and 81 hours 
per week during peak season, averaging 1 hour per day and 10 hours per week more 
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than controls (includes all work time, not just flight hours). Paradoxically, nearly 
90% of these pilots reported that they never flew when so fatigued that they wanted 
to decline the flight (corroborating the finding that their operators did not view pilot 
fatigue as a scheduling problem), compared to 64% of pilot controls. Although three 
times as many case pilots (18%) reported that they decided to fly into unknown 
weather every day, there was no significant difference between case and control pilots 
in their likelihood of perceiving their job as more dangerous than other jobs. All pilots 
of cases reported relying on headquarters or hub personnel, and station managers or 
other personnel at their destinations for the decision to launch a flight.
Table 10. Test results of selected characteristics and working conditions of pilots employed by operators 
having a high number of fatal crashes and other operators
Pilots, high 
fatal (cases)
Pilots, other 
(controls)
Significance 
(t or c2)
Sample size 28 146
Pilot characteristics
Female 0 7 0.22*
Mean age, years 39 43 0.12
Mean flight career (years) 11 16 0.02
Mean flight hours, total 7,319 9,538 0.16
Mean flight hours in last 12 months 804 639 0.02
Mean flight hours in Alaska 5,881 6,713 0.55
Mean flight hours in Alaska in last 12 months 756 557 0.00†
Mean instrument hours overall 413 912 0.01
Mean instrument hours in Alaska 291 578 0.04 
Mean number of employers (as pilot) 4 4 0.85
Total hours with current employer 1,806 3,732 0.00†
Working conditions
Average hours per work day (busy season) 13 12 0.00†
Average hours per work week (busy season) 81 71 0.00†
View job as more dangerous than other jobs (%) 48 45 0.73
Never flew when fatigued and wanted to decline flight (%) 89 64 0.01
Decides to fly into unknown weather daily (%) 18 6 0.04
Use hub/HQ personnel before launching (%) 100 86 0.04
Use station manager/other personnel at destination(s) 
before launching (%)
100 88 0.05
* Fisher’s exact test was employed due to small numbers.
† Indicates p-value less than 0.005.
Bold values indicate p-value ≤ 0.05.
One reason why pilots of case operators reported flying significantly more hours per 
day and per week than pilots of control operators might be that the risk of accidents is 
proportional to hours flown, and the greater flight activity of case pilots simply gives 
them more exposure to the risk of accidents. For this explanation to be correct, the 
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assignment of operators to cases and controls would have to be biased toward placing 
operators with more pilot hours per day and per week into the case group, given each 
operator’s underlying accident risk. 
The evidence for such an alternative explanation of the results was examined by 
testing whether pilot hours per week predicted an operator’s case-control status after 
controlling for total hours flown (exposure). To perform this test, a binary probit 
equation was estimated in which the dependent variable was case or control status 
based on fatal crashes per pilot, and independent variables were accidents per total 
hours flown and average survey pilot hours per week. If using accidents per hour 
flown to divide operators into cases and controls would have yielded similar results to 
using accidents per pilot (except for the difference in power), then the coefficient for 
accidents per hour flown in the estimated equation would be positive and significant. 
If using accidents per pilot biased the case-control selection toward firms with greater 
pilot hours per week, then hours flown per week would have a significant positive 
coefficient. 
Results of estimating this probit equation showed no evidence of bias in the 
assignment of firms with higher pilot hours per week to the case group. The equation 
predicted case or control status correctly 97% of the time, with fatal accidents per 
hour flown positive and significant (Wald chi-square test p<0.01) and hours flown 
per week near zero and insignificant (Wald chi-square test p=0.94). This provides 
strong evidence that using the number of pilots instead of total hours did not bias the 
assignment of operators.
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4.1 Operators and Pilots – Activities, Practices and Perceptions
Operators and pilots both strongly supported improving meteorological services and 
consultation, including weather prediction, reporting, and deployment of more video 
weather cameras in critical locales, and increased numbers and involvement of trained 
weather observers. While there are on-going increases in the deployment of weather 
cameras and constant refinement of weather prediction and Web-based access to these 
predictions and current conditions, funding and administrative support for weather 
observers and Flight Service Station personnel has been controversial in Alaska for 
some time. Narrative responses to open-ended portions of the questionnaires and 
discussions in focus groups reflected a wide distrust of the accuracy of automated 
weather observation (beyond the direct form afforded by the weather cameras) and a 
strong desire to be able to talk with someone at a destination and in communities en 
route to consult on current conditions, near-term weather prediction, and advisable 
and/or best routes. The National Weather Service has been responsive to some of these 
concerns with the development of real-time weather consultations between pilots and 
personnel via the “mike-in-hand” program (http://www.alaska.faa.gov/at/notices/
WX.htm).
The strong support expressed by both operators and pilots for improvements in and 
wider utilization of training in decision making (particularly for visual flight rules into 
marginal and instrument meteorological conditions), flat light, whiteout conditions, 
and regional hazards should facilitate the implementation of such measures. Support 
for more supervised flight time for pilots, particularly in their own region, and better 
checks of pilots’ preemployment flying history by air carrier operators indicate that 
such changes should also be reasonably well received. There was also detectable 
support, though not as strong, for written criteria for go/no go decisions, pilot rewards 
for safe flying, and improved passenger understanding of weather hazards; thus, 
these interventions, if pursued, should be implemented more cautiously, with active 
consultation and collaboration with industry leaders and pilots. 
Strategies involving changes in time allowed for delivery and how service is allocated 
for bypass mail were the least popular. While the majority of large operators expressed 
some enthusiasm for affording more time for delivery of bypass mail, and a slim 
majority supported changes in how it is allocated, neither of these measures were 
supported by smaller operators. Pilots working for larger operators only deemed 
increasing delivery time as likely to be “somewhat effective,” while the majority 
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responded that allocation changes would not be effective. In general, the results 
of operator-pilot comparisons suggested that the differing financial pressures and 
incentives on operators and pilots may influence their views on what measures would 
be effective in preventing crashes. Results indicated that a respondent’s position in a 
company (operator or pilot) was more influential in determining their responses than 
the company they worked for.
Large and small operators differed in their ability to provide procedural and 
operational risk-reduction measures. A higher percentage of large operators had 
formal programs to implement risk-reduction measures, including pilot training 
and check rides. Several of the large firms also operated under CFR Part 121; these 
firms also employed the vast majority of pilots in the state. The larger, more diverse 
operators would likely be more able to provide formal training procedures to their 
pilots. Responses from pilots from large and small firms were similar with regard 
to total flight hours, although pilots varied greatly in their instrument experience. 
Almost all pilots had the ability to cancel flights.
A consistent finding from both the operator and pilot surveys was the high intensity 
of work during the peak season. The average reported work day (duty hours, not flight 
hours) for a pilot was 11.5 hours, and the reported work week was 71 hours. Over 86% 
of the pilots reported that they worked more than 50 hours a week during the busy 
season. Fatigue can occur from disrupted sleep due to changing schedules, as well 
as a lack of sleep, and cumulative sleep loss can lead to impaired performance and 
diminished alertness.19
4.2 Comparisons of Large Operators and Their Pilots
In opinions expressed about the likely effectiveness of interventions, pilots viewed 
additional training as more effective than did operators, while operators often viewed 
preemployment hiring checks to be more effective than did pilots. These differences 
appear to reflect the differing perspectives of the two parties. Similarly, pilots viewed 
better weather reporting as more effective, but were less enthusiastic than operators 
about better passenger understanding of weather hazards; changes in bypass mail 
policies and financial incentives for safety also seemed to reflect differing perspectives.
Operators and pilots had different perceptions regarding fatigue. Only 6% of the large 
operators perceived that fatigue was a major problem in scheduling, while the pilots 
working for these firms indicated that fatigue during the peak season was more of a 
problem, and 22% responded that they made a decision to fly when fatigued either weekly 
or monthly. For small operators, where the operator might be the only pilot, a small 
percentage (13%) of these operator/pilots responded that they made a decision to fly when 
fatigued on a weekly basis. None of the respondents from small operations responded that 
they made a decision to fly when fatigued on a monthly basis.
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4.3 Case and Control Comparisons
The primary significant differences found between Alaska commuter airline and 
air taxi cases and controls involved flight experience, duty hours, and bypass mail 
delivery. Case pilots reported fewer years of experience and half as many flying hours 
with their current employer as did control pilots. Pilots flying for case firms had half 
as many hours with their current employer as did control pilots. Alaska pilots for 
case operators flew, on average, 1 hour more per day and 10 hours more per week 
than control pilots, although fewer of them reported declining a flight due to fatigue. 
Case pilots were three times as likely as controls to fly daily into unknown weather 
conditions. Case operators were also significantly more likely to consider timely 
delivery of bypass mail important to their financial success.
Operators did not differ significantly in the risk reduction measures reported to be 
in place, although most measures were more commonly reported by case operators. 
However, the survey instrument could not distinguish whether risk reduction 
measures were historical or put in place in response to a crash. A high percentage 
of both case and control operators reported various training activities in place. No 
significant differences in training were found, despite the fact that several companies 
in the control group (but no cases) also held CFR Part 121 certificates and might be 
presumed to have more opportunity and support for in-house training than those 
without the additional certificate. Although reported training differed little between 
cases and controls, a higher percentage of case pilots reported deciding to fly into 
unknown weather on a daily basis compared to control pilots.
Differences between cases and controls could not be explained by case firms operating 
more aircraft, since data in the VIS indicated that case and control firms operated 
similar numbers of aircraft per operator. Differences between case and control 
companies regarding their fleet composition are unlikely to explain the differences 
observed in accident rates. According to NTSB data, single-engine aircraft, which 
predominated the fleet of case companies, do not have a higher fatal accident rate 
overall than rotorcraft, which were more common in control companies (1.22 
accidents per 100,000 hours for single-engine aircraft, 1.48 accidents per 100,000 for 
rotorcraft20).
Although pilots in both groups worked long hours, a critical difference between pilots 
who flew for case operators and those who flew for control firms was time spent at 
work. The long hours are consistent with other surveys showing that pilots in regional 
flight operations worked longer duty days on average than in short-haul operations, 
even though their daily flight times were comparable.21 Research has indicated that 
tired pilots flying short- and long-haul flights may not be aware of the effects of 
fatigue on their flight task performance.22 The longer duty hours worked by case pilots 
combined with the higher rate at which they decide to fly into unknown weather may 
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increase the risk of making a fatal error in judgment. Pilot age may also play a role, 
with pilot youthfulness acting as a factor mitigating the perception of fatigue.22 This 
relationship should be investigated further to see if some pilots who operate under 
CFR Part 135—especially younger pilots—are flying such long hours, or so many 
hours per week, that they become unable to identify their limitations because of 
fatigue.
4.4 Strengths, Potential Limitations, and Biases
This survey is one of only a few studies in Alaska which has addressed safety practices 
and economic incentives that might put pressure on operators and pilots to fly in 
unsafe conditions. It is the only study in Alaska which randomly surveyed the entire 
air taxi and commuter airline industry, providing results which can be used to 
describe the state industry as a whole. The results will provide a baseline for future 
evolution of safety improvements associated with the Alaska Interagency Aviation 
Safety Initiative.
Survey bias can come from many sources, and all can limit the usefulness of the results. 
Biases can include a nonrepresentative sample, differences between those who respond 
to the survey and those who do not, and answers that are influenced by recent events 
and thus not representative of long-term attitudes and practices.
Every possible effort was made to select a representative sample that encompasses the 
diverse population of air taxi, commuter, and public agency operators and pilots across 
Alaska, and the results were weighted in accordance with the stratified sampling. 
Sample weights cannot correct for bias in who responds to a survey. Response bias 
means that people who responded to the survey may be different from people who 
did not participate. ISER research staff assessed response bias using publicly available 
data for the population. No significant relationship was found between accident rate 
and whether operators were willing to complete the survey. Likewise, size and location 
were not associated with a greater likelihood of response or refusal/noncontact. 
Other factors important to the analysis may have differed between respondents and 
nonrespondents; for example, operators with a limited concern for safety or who were 
experiencing financial difficulties may have systematically refused to respond. There is 
no way in this study to measure these possible effects; however, the 79% response rate 
appears high enough to suggest a representative sample.
Three events that occurred during the course of the operator survey may have 
affected many operators’ responses. The tragic events of September 11, 2001, at the 
World Trade Center, Pentagon, and in Pennsylvania shut down aviation operations 
nationwide. In response to the uncertainty in the aviation industry and concern 
among respondents, interviewing was suspended for 1 week. Two serious air crashes 
in Alaska occurred during the following month. On October 10, 2001, one of the 
largest regional operators in Alaska sustained the worst commercial crash in Alaska 
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since 1987—a crash on take-off that killed all 10 on board. On October 18, 2001, 
another of Alaska’s largest regional carriers crashed a helicopter into Cook Inlet, 
killing three people. A series of events of this magnitude is likely to have affected 
operators’ attitudes, perceptions, and business practices, but the extent of these effects 
is unknown.
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Based on the findings from this survey, Alaska operators should consider examining 
their work schedules and carefully evaluate whether their pilots have adequate 
opportunity for rest between duty times (or shifts) and sufficiently frequent days 
off to recuperate before returning to work. The National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration recommends sufficient breaks between duty periods to permit 8 hours 
of uninterrupted sleep in addition to sufficient time for transport, meals, and other 
essential activities.23 Even the duty hours reported by control carriers in the case-
control analysis may be too long to provide for adequate rest. During the busiest parts 
of the season, care should also be taken to minimize the impact of circadian shifts 
resulting from major changes in the timing of duty hours. Operators and pilots may 
also want to consider allowing time for naps and some physical exercise between busy 
duty periods.
Operators should also be informed of the potential risks associated with having 
inexperienced pilots flying long hours in Alaska. Although previous research is 
unclear as to the role inexperience plays, this analysis indicates that further research 
is needed to parse out how inexperience, especially inexperience flying in Alaska, 
contributes to fatal aviation accidents.
5 Recommendations
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Surveyed pilots’ reported perception that their risk for fatal injury while working is 
low to moderate is not consistent with reality. The pilot fatality rate in Alaska is nearly 
five times the rate for all U.S. pilots (70 per 100,000 per year). Although survey results 
did not reveal a single underlying factor that could be identified as the cause of the 
high crash rates for Alaska commuter and air taxi operations, it did suggest that a 
number of factors—pilot fatigue and inexperience, financial pressures on operators, 
inadequate weather information—may be associated with higher accident risks. These 
factors may interact with each other to increase the risk. Policies and programs could 
address the factors and possibly mitigate the risks.
Fatigue has repeatedly been shown to be an important factor in increasing the 
probability of an aviation accident.19, 23, 24 Current regulations (CFR Part 135.263, 
135.265, 135.267, 135.269, 91.1057, and 91.1059) include rest requirements and flight 
hour limitations on a daily, quarterly, and annual basis. The duty hour limitations 
are only daily and do not directly impose weekly or monthly limits. Operators could 
adhere to these CFR’s and still have pilots working up to 7 days of 14 hours a day or 98 
hours a week. Total duty hours, especially for pilots flying long duty days, with many 
legs per day for many days in a row, are an important predictor of fatigue,22, 25 and 
research by Goode showed that for CFR Part 121 operations, the relative proportion of 
accidents to exposure increases as the length of the duty day increases.24
The survey did not directly address why operators are having their pilots work such long 
duty days. Financial dependence on bypass mail may have created pressure for operators 
to keep pilots on long duty hours, possibly decreasing the margin of safety. Delivery of 
bypass mail involves flying in and out of small rural airports that have limited infrastructure 
and weather information services throughout the year. It is unlikely overtime pay was a 
motivator for pilots to work long hours, since few operators offered overtime pay. Instead, 
the short peak season and inevitable layoffs during winter may have provided an incentive 
for pilots to fly as much as possible when work was available.
Many of the responses received in these surveys were largely consistent with the 
objectives of three major programs in Alaska.
Medallion Foundation: Pilot hazard training, which was supported by both 
operators and pilots in the survey, is being conducted by this foundation 
•
6 Conclusion
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in a nonprofit, private-government collaboration to provide organizational 
tools, training, and technical support to the aviation industry in Alaska. The 
foundation, incorporated in November 2001, includes many of the procedural 
and training interventions mentioned in the survey and provides training 
opportunities to pilots in small operations. 
FAA’s Circle of Safety: Announced to the public in late 2002, this program 
provides consumer education and emphasizes passenger understanding of the 
hazards of flying. While the industry expressed only guarded enthusiasm in 
the survey for passenger understanding as being a helpful intervention, clear 
consensus was expressed among survey respondents that passenger pressure 
to fly into adverse weather or poor visibility was an unhelpful and a potentially 
dangerous influence. 
Capstone: This program introduces high-technology navigational avionics in a 
compact suite of equipment designed for use in small aircraft. The first aircraft was 
equipped in November 1999. This innovative technology may provide much better 
information to inform pilot decision making and navigation. The latest Capstone 
proposal (phase III) is to equip all Alaskan aircraft with avionics (multifunction 
display for navigation, terrain, traffic and flight information; Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance-Broadcast and GPS Wide Area Augmentation System) and reduce 
dependency on earlier ground-based systems.26
These surveys have provided insight into the current operation of Alaska’s aviation 
industry and assessed the acceptability of a wide range of possible interventions. Results 
from the survey and the additional case-control analysis might focus future research and 
prevention measures on identifying fatigue, stressing the importance of experience, and 
highlighting the potential costs of long days and work weeks for pilots.
•
•
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Appendix A. Operator/Small Operator Questionnaire Summary
The stratified sample meant that ISER staff spoke to almost all the larger operators in the 
state, but only about one in five of the smallest operators.  To reflect the aviation 
community more accurately, the small operator results were weighted to account for the 
same two-thirds of all operators in the weighted sample that they represent in the total 
population.  With the exception of OP1 and OP4, all counts are either to 153 or to the 
subset of 153 who responded to a given question.  Occasionally, rounding the weighted 
results meant that the total answers varied by plus-or-minus 1.  For OP1 (number of 
pilots) and OP4 (hours and departures), ISER staff estimated statewide totals representing 
the estimated 345 operators active in Alaska during the survey period.
OP1. How many pilots do you currently employ? 
Average of 5.38 pilots with a range of 0 to 105 pilots currently employed.   
Just over half (52%) of Alaska operators employ only 1 pilot. 
Pilot estimate for all Alaska companies: 1856 +/- 185 
OP2. How many pilots do you typically employ each season? 
Averages:
5.57 Summer 4.75 Autumn 4.12 Winter 4.52 Spring
OP3. How many pilots did your company hire in each of the last 3 years? 
Average:
1.78 2001 (total expected) 
1.94 2000
1.76 1999
OP4. Please list total flight hours and departures flown by your company in 2000 (both 
scheduled and unscheduled).  Include all locations and aircraft. 
This estimate is for all operators statewide. 
420,000
(275,000-565,000) 
Scheduled flight 
hours
412,000
(293,000-532,000) 
Scheduled
departures
415,000
(370,000-460,000) 
Unscheduled
flight hours 
503,000
(405,000-594,000) 
Unscheduled
departures
OP5. Every year the FAA mails a survey–the General Aviation and Air Taxi Activity 
survey– to some aircraft owners asking about how the aircraft was used during the 
previous year.  Has your company received any of these surveys the last three 
years?  (You may have received several surveys asking about different aircraft.) 
27%: No 48%: Yes 25%: Don’t Know 
Ð
How many were received, and how many were completed and returned? 
Year Number of surveys 
received
Number of surveys 
completed / returned 
2001 Average:   .97    Average:  .56   
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2000 Average: 1.23  Average:  .99   
1999 Average:   .97   Average:  .80   
OP6. If you had to choose between the types of experience listed below when hiring a 
pilot, which would be the most important? Which would rank second? 3rd? 4th? 
[These questions were asked of only of the 64 (weighted) companies that had 
hired pilots.] 
 [# = Respondents] 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th NoAnswer
a.  Flying in the area of Alaska where the 
pilot will be employed 30  13 7 11 2 
b.  Flying anywhere in Alaska (total 
Alaska flight hours) 2 14 29 17 2 
c.  Total Flying hours anywhere 14 11 11 26 3 
d.  Flying in the type of aircraft your 
company uses: 16 24 14 8 2 
OP7. Is there some other pilot experience or qualification more important than any of 
these four? 
 No (48% of operators)  Yes (52% of operators)
Ð
OP7a. Please describe it. 
o Specific character qualities were most commonly cited as important.  
Qualities listed were: Judgment, decision-making, attitude, discipline, steady, 
level head, professional, cautious, commitment to safety, older, mature. 
o Experience was the second most often listed qualification.  Types of 
experience listed include: Alaska specific, large aircraft, interagency, 
firefighting, flight instructor, owner flown, off-airport, external load, 
seaplanes, round engine, bad weather, remote area, and flying IMC w/out 
radar
o A few listed the class of aircraft as important. 
o A few listed accident/incident face hours/violation face hours as important. 
OP8. How much of a problem is pilot fatigue in pilot scheduling? 
 Major problem:  7
 Minor problem:  58
 Not a problem:  87
 (1 missing answer) 
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OP9. How do you pay your pilots? (Not asked of 1-pilot operators) 
 Hourly for all duty hours:  2
 Hourly for flight hours only:  10
 Salary:  21
 Combination of salary and flight hours: 25
 Combination of flight hours, duty hours and salary:    7
 Flight completions:  None
 Other (please explain):  9
Ð
o Most explained some minimum salary plus extra pay for extra 
hours, days, etc. 
o Some pay by hourly rate with different rates for flight hours, 
standby hours, and extra hours. 
o Some said that they pay by daily rate. 
o A few pay per customer as part of the wage 
o One listed family labor 
OP10. Do you pay your pilots overtime? (Not asked of 1-pilot operators) 
58 No 16 Yes    (out of 73 Respondents)
Ð
OP10a. Under what conditions?  
o Half of those who pay overtime do so for all hours worked over some fixed 
limit.  The standard ranged from 60 hours per month to 100 hours per 
month; from 4 flight hours to 8 total hours per day. 
o Several paid extra for pilots temporarily stationed away from home. 
o A few paid overtime for extra days worked, such as on scheduled days off, or 
for “hard work.”
OP11. From your personal experience, are the Federal Aviation Regulations interpreted 
consistently by different inspectors at different times? 
67 No 86 Yes 1 No Answer
Ð
OP11a. Please give one or more examples.  
o Operators deal with multiple inspectors and say that each inspector 
interprets the regulations differently.   
o They listed maintenance requirements, paperwork, airworthiness, service 
directives, and operations procedures, flight and duty time rules and de-icing 
rules.
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OP12. Do you feel that some Federal Aviation Regulations interfere with getting the job 
done, without contributing to safety? 
63 No  86 Yes 4 No Answer 
Ð
 OP12a.  Please indicate which regulations and why (in order of 
frequency):
o Visibility, weather and altitude regulations
o Hazardous materials regulations 
o Duty time regulations 
o Interpretation of regulations (rather than the regulation itself)  
o Drug testing. 
o Maintenance regulations. 
OP13. Does your company require higher than FAA weather minimums for flying? 
118 No  33 Yes  3 No Answer
Ð
OP13a. Please of describe your policy or attach a copy.  Note 
when your company began this requirement 
o No one attached a copy of their policy; most wrote a brief description 
o New or inexperienced pilots are held to higher weather minimums
o Greater visibility required at night or in the mountains 
o Several said they simply don’t fly in bad weather 
o When implemented: Answers range from 1970 to 2001 
OP14. Does your company have written programs for pilot training to help pilots deal 
with the following conditions: [# = Respondents]
 Yes No If yes, when started
a.  Whiteout conditions 41 109 1970-2000 
b.  Low visibility conditions 49 102 1970-2000 
c.  Flat lighting conditions 41 110 1970-2000 
d.  Recovery from inadvertent flight into IMC 51 99 1970-2001 
OP15. Does your company have written programs for pilot checking to ensure pilot 
proficiency in the following conditions:
 Yes No If yes, when started
a.  Whiteout conditions 32  119  1975-2000 
b.  Low visibility conditions 38  113  1970-2000 
c.  Flat lighting conditions 31  120  1975-2000 
d.  Recovery from inadvertent flight into IMC 41  110  1970-2001 
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OP16. Who can decide to cancel a flight? 
 Pilot  (Yes:  151, No:  1, Missing:  1) 
 Someone else in the company (Yes:  64, No:  72, Missing:  17) 
Ð
(Who is it?) Common answers: Chief Pilot, Director of Operations, Dispatch, 
Manager, Owner, and President
Someone outside the company (Yes:  14, No:  122, Missing:  17) 
Ð
(Who is it?)  Common answers: Customer/Passenger 
OP17. If a non-pilot employee makes decisions about launching flights, what training 
(initial and recurrent) does the company provide or require that person to have? 
o Some (especially those referring to passengers canceling) said that no 
training is provided or required. 
o Others cited some type of dispatch training, including weather training. 
o Several listed informal training, such as discussions, experience, working 
with the operations manager. 
o A few stated they train personnel using the operations manual procedures or 
the Federal Aviation Regulations. 
o A few cited training without specifying the topic(s). 
OP18. Does your company have a written list of required conditions to launch a flight 
(for example, a risk assessment worksheet)? 
143 No 10 Yes 
Ð
OP18a When did your company start using this list?  
Ranged from 1971-2001 
   OP18b. Please attach a copy of this list. 
     Only 3 included a list 
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OP19. How many of your aircraft have the following types of equipment? 
Number of operators with each type of equipment in 
none, or some, of their aircraft: 
0
aircraft
1 or 
more
aircraft
No
Answer
a.  Auto pilot 97 51 5 
b.  Very high frequency Omni-directional Range 39 111 3 
c.  Global Positioning System–Visual Flight Rules 9 141 4 
d.  Global Positioning System–Instrumental Flight Rules 98 49 6 
e.  Long range navigation 116 31 6 
f.  Mid-air collision avoidance system 135 13 6 
g. Other Avionics: 4 66 83 
h.  Pilot shoulder harness 7 142 4 
i.  Rear Passenger shoulder harness 91 58 4 
j.  Pilot 5-point restraint harness 122 26 6 
k. Other crash protection equipment  131 19 3 
Please rate each type as very helpful, somewhat helpful, or not at all helpful to flight 
safety in Alaska (not just to your company). [# = Respondents]:
Type of equipment 
V
er
y 
H
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pf
ul
 
So
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ew
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t 
H
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pf
ul
 
N
ot
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t a
ll 
H
el
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ul
 
M
is
si
ng
a. Auto pilot 30 28 23 72
b. Very High Frequency Omni-directional Range 51 50 18 34
c. Global Positioning System–Visual Flight Rules 132 7 2 12
d. Global Positioning System–Instrumental Flight Rules 48 19 10 76
e.  Long Range Navigation 9 22 40 83
f.  Mid-air collision avoidance system 24 16 17 96
g.  Other Avionics:_________________ 50 23 1 80 
h.  Pilot shoulder harness 122 14 6 12
i.  Rear Passenger shoulder harness 49 29 5 70
j.  Pilot 5-point restraint harness 21 29 10 93
k. Other crash protection equipment: ____________ 18 4 1 130 
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OP20. How important is each of the following to your company’s financial success?
[# = Respondents]
V
er
y
Im
po
rta
nt
Im
po
rta
nt
N
ot
Im
po
rta
nt
N
ot
A
pp
lic
ab
le
N
o 
A
ns
w
er
 
a. On-time delivery of mail 15 13 23 97 5 
b. On-time delivery of passengers 50 61 18 23 1 
c. On-time delivery of cargo 36 57 26 29 6 
OP21. In the last 18 months, have your company’s insurance costs per seat changed? 
112 Yes   38 No  
106 Increased 
   6 Decreased  
Ð
OP21a. By what percent did they increase or decrease?  
 Increases ranged from 1% to 320% 
Mean:   23% 
Median: 15% 
Mode:   10% 
OP21b. If your insurance costs changed, why do you believe they changed? 
o Accident rates, court claims, industry losses were most frequently cited. 
o Next most frequent was lack of competition, too few insurance companies, 
greed.
o Other reasons noted once were inflation, September 11th.
OP22. What survival equipment, beyond legally-required items, is in your company 
aircraft? 
o About one-third said that they carry only what is legally required. 
o Others listed sleeping/camping gear such as blankets, sleeping bags, tarps, 
and tents, food and/or water, stove, extra clothing, ax, knife, signaling 
devices, a company survival kit, and/or a first aid kit 
o Some listed satellite phones, and/or cell phones
o One carries a life vest; one a life raft. 
OP23. What training does your company provide to use the survival equipment in the 
aircraft? 
o One in four operators said they provide no training, just self-training, or 
pilots “should know.” 
o Most of those who provide training incorporate it into their regular pilot 
training.
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o Some listed a type of informal training such as a discussion, staff meeting, or 
training by a manual. 
o A few offer annual, intensive, crash-survival training such as egress, water 
egress, and fire control training. 
OP24. The table below asks your opinion about measures that might improve aviation 
safety throughout Alaska (not just in your company).  For each measure, rate 
how effective you think it could be in preventing aircraft crashes if it were 
widely applied in Alaska aviation. [# = Respondents] 
Possible measures to use in preventing aircraft crashes 
V
er
y
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fe
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e 
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m
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t
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e 
N
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e 
Pilot training improvements in the following areas: 
a.  Meteorology 68 67 14 
b.  Decision-making 105 36 8 
c.  White-out/flat-light conditions 85 58 5 
d.  Regional hazards 103 40 5 
Company policies and procedures 
e.  Written criteria for go/no-go decisions 46 61 39 
f.  Rewards from management for flights or flight hours   
     without accidents/incidents 34 66 46 
g.  Pay based on salary rather than flight hours or flights 43 73 30 
h.  More flight time required of new pilots 59 54 33 
i.   Better checks of a pilot’s flying history before hiring 45 62 39 
j.   More locations with manned weather reporting 127 23 2 
k.  More locations with automated weather reporting 90 48 13 
l.   Increased accuracy of existing weather reporting 117 31 4 
m. Increased and improved use of video cameras, such as 
mountain pass cameras 107 30 12 
n.  Improved passenger understanding of weather hazards 48 54 48 
o.  Changes in how by-pass mail is given to operators  16 28 71 
p.  More time to deliver by-pass mail before it’s switched to  
     another operator 18 32 64 
q.  Financial incentives (e.g., lower insurance rates, 
preference in mail contracts) for flights or flight hours 
without accidents/incidents 
58 46 38 
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OP25. If you had to choose just two of the above items as most useful, which would 
they be?  Please indicate the appropriate letter. 
Top 5 Answers # citing as 
important
24J:   More Locations with weather reporting 76 
24B:  Pilot training in decision making 45 
24D:  Pilot training in regional hazards 27 
24M: Increased use of video cameras (mountain pass cameras) 27 
24L:  Increased accuracy of existing weather reporting 25 
OP26. Are there any other measures we didn’t mention that might improve aviation 
safety in Alaska? 
37 Yes 14 No  102 Missing
 What are they? 
o More experience and more training for pilots most commonly cited. 
o Many listed technical improvements, such as Global Positioning System, 
Capstone avionics, more weather cameras. 
o Several wanted more manned weather stations. 
o Some cited a good pilot attitude, common sense, and a commitment to safety. 
o A few said that weather and visibility regulations need to be enforced, as well 
as the Visual Flight Rules minimum increased. 
o Other reasons noted included a shorter duty day, more flexible Federal 
Aviation Regulations, more knowledgeable management. 
OP 27.   Please add any other comments about aviation safety in Alaska you think we 
should know. 
o Change the attitude of pilots flying in Alaska.
o Education of the customer, if customer pressure is mitigated that is one safety 
initiative.  
o Major concern with maintenance, maintenance guys aren't getting paid enough 
and are overworked. 
o One of the biggest driving forces for safety is insurance companies, Federal 
Aviation Administration doesn't have any teeth at all. 
o Don't do these surveys during peak season. 
o Real shortage of competent pilots available for seasonal work in AK. Forced to 
hire pilots below standards. No amount of training in a one or two-week period 
is going to help these pilots. 
o Require higher than average pilot experience, 3 times Federal Aviation 
Administration minimum 1500 hours, can't hire teenagers as some carriers do. 
o Federal Aviation Administration inspectors are good, but their caseloads are too 
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large; they don't have time to help companies make improvements. 
o Training pilots not to push weather with aircraft that are Visual Flight Rules-
equipped, that it is all right to turn around or stop the flight. 
o Need pilot license in State in which you're flying including proficiency in actual 
flight area.
o One Question not asked is:  Should the Federal Aviation Administration up the 
drug and alcohol policy? What is the ratio of private pilot to company pilot 
fatalities?
o More cameras/Capstone!  
o No time builders, should want to fly and stay in Alaska. 
o Safety needs to start at the top within each company and be effectively 
communicated throughout the company. 
o New pilots from outside need close supervision and decision-making help until 
they gain experience. 
o All aircraft should be equipped for flight icing conditions if used in air carrier 
service. All air carrier flights should be Instrument Flight Rules all the time. 
o Needs some accountability for Federal Aviation Administration inspectors when 
they interpret regulations. 
o Get manned weather into all villages. That will cut down on accidents 25%. 
o Pilot judgment errors are the principal cause of accidents. 
o Automated weather systems are not working. 
o Flight Standards District Office often contributes to pilots flying in poor weather 
by allowing Visual Flight Rules only operators to fly when weather is below 
Visual Flight Rules min (500 +2). 
o Need to have a committee (union, etc.) to represent pilots who need specific help 
in solving aviation-related needs.
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Throughout, MV = N indicates the number of missing values for the question. 
I would like to begin by asking you a few questions about your flying career and your 
background. (MV = 3) 
A1. Which pilot ratings and certificates do you hold? 
Commercial Yes = 210; No = 50 Single-engine land Yes = 218; No = 42 
Instrument Yes = 195; No = 65 Multi-engine land Yes = 156; No = 104 
ATP Yes = 132; No = 128 Single-engine sea Yes = 142; No = 118 
Helicopter Yes = 50; No = 210 Multi-engine sea Yes = 39; No = 221 
Flight instructor Yes = 73; No = 187 Others (please specify) Yes = 25; No = 235 
Ð
A&P Mechanic, Airframe/powerplant, Airframe mechanic, 
BV234, CFI Instrument, Commercial Sea, CU580, C212, DC3, 
DC6, DC7 
Flight engineer, Glider, Glider/sail plane, Gliding AeroTow, 
LR-Jet/glider, Mechanical airframe, Multiple others, Tail 
Wheel time, Turbojet engineer, Type SK70  
(Of the pilots who answered “no” to commercial, 40 had an airline transport pilot license, 
8 were public agency employees [who don’t need a commercial] license, and 2 were Part 
135 pilots who said they didn’t have a commercial license.)  
A2. How many total hours have you flown in Alaska?  How many in the last 12 
months?  Now can you tell us how many Alaska departures have you made in your 
total flight career?  In the last 12 months?  Finally, can you tell us how many total 
hours you have flown in all locations, including Alaska?  How many in the last 12 
months?  
Flight Hours Alaska Alaska Departures All Locations, including Alaska 
Total Flight Career N=261; MV=2; Mean=7374.78
N=187; MV=76 
Mean=12480.96
N=256; MV=7; 
Mean=9340.6
Last 12 months N=261; MV=2; Mean=633.66
N=186; MV=77; 
Mean=1445.18
N=245; MV=18; 
Mean=664.84
The next questions ask about your total flight career. 
A3. How many instrument hours have you flown in Alaska? Î N=260; MV=3; 
Mean=567.83 Median=77.5 
A3a. Can you estimate your total number of instrument hours?  
 N=259; MV=4; Mean=885.505; median =175 
A4. How many hours have you flown for your current employer?  
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 N=202; MV=61; Mean=3542.104 
A5. Thinking about the number of years you have flown in Alaska, how many have 
been seasonal? 
N=199; MV=64; Mean=2.256 Years
A5a. How many have been year-round? N=202; MV=61; Mean=9.244 Years
A6. Please estimate what percent of your paid flight hours in 2000 occurred in each 
season. (For example, 100% summer; or 25% spring, 50% summer, 25% autumn, 
etc.)
% Spring % Autumn 
% Summer % Winter 
A7. Over your entire career, how many different companies have you worked for as a 
pilot?
N=262; MV=1; Mean=3.90 
A7a. Over how many years has that been?  
N=258; MV=5; Mean=16.076 
A8. What is your gender? (MV=1)
 Female: N=  13 
 Male:    N=249
 A8a.  How old are you? (MV=3)
N=260; Mean=44.08 
A9. What is your race? (2 refused; MV=2)
American Indian or Alaska Native:  10 Asian Indian: 0
White:  251 Japanese:  0
Black, African American, or Negro:  0 Native Hawaiian: 0
Chinese:  0 Guamanian or Chamorro:  0
Korean:  0 Filipino:  0
Vietnamese:  0 Samoan:  0
Other Asian: 1 Other Pacific Islander:  0
Some other race (please specify):  1
Ð
Other described: Latino=1 
A10. What is the highest level of formal education you have completed? (PLEASE 
MARK ONLY ONE) (MV=2)
Attended high school; didn’t graduate: 2 Associate’s degree:  33
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GED:  3 Bachelor’s degree:  95
High school diploma:  33 Master’s degree: 13
Attended college; no degree: 81 Doctoral degree:  1
A11. Now, based on your experience as a pilot, do you feel that some Federal Aviation 
Regulations interfere with getting the job done, without contributing to safety? 
(MV=10)
 No 149 Yes 104
Ð
A11a. Can you give me one or more examples? (examples
given=94)
A12. Are there routes, locations, or conditions that should require higher than FAA 
minimum weather conditions for flying? (MV=67)
 No 148  Yes 48
Ð
A12a. What are they? (Descriptions included=48) 
A13. During the peak season, what hours do you typically work each day, including 
periods of time you are not on duty? 
From _____ AM/PM to _____AM/PM  
On average from 0700 to 1900; calculated mean hours/day=11.8; N=261; 
MV=2
A14. During the peak season, how many hours per day are you typically on duty?
Duty hours per day 11.931; N=260; MV=3 
A15. During the peak season, how many days per week do you typically work? 
Days per week mean=5.897; N=261; MV=2 
7 days    89 pilots 
6 – 6.5 107 
5 - 5.5   45 
<5   11 
No typical week     9 
A16. During the peak season, how often would you have liked to decline a flight due to 
fatigue, but you flew anyway?  (MARK ONLY ONE) (MV=2)
 Daily:  2  Less often than monthly:  51
 Weekly:  20  Never:  172
 Monthly:  16
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A17. How often do you have to decide whether to fly into unknown weather conditions 
that may deteriorate below Visual Flight Rules minimums?  (MARK ONLY 
ONE)
(MV=4; Don't know=1) 
 Daily:  23  Less often than monthly:  67
 Weekly:  64  Never:  41
 Monthly:  63
A18. How often do you fly into weather that is different from what was predicted when 
you started your flight?  (MARK ONLY ONE) (MV=1)
 Daily:  22  Less often than monthly:  47
 Weekly:  108  Never:  6
 Monthly:  7
A19. How often do Flight Service Stations provide accurate, current weather conditions 
for where you fly?  (MARK ONLYONE) (Don't use = 2; Don't know = 1; MV 
= 2) 
 Always:  15  Rarely:  14
 Most of the time:  202  Never:  5
 Occasionally:  22
A20. While working for your current employer, have you declined a flight due to poor 
visibility or other weather-related reasons? (MV=61) 
 No:  16       Yes:  186
A21. Did the company support your decision? (Also:  Not always=1; Missing 
Answer=81) 
 No:  179  Yes:  2
A22. Do you have standard procedures to follow if you unexpectedly fly into IMC? 
 No:  63  Yes:  196 (MV = 4) 
A23. Has your employer provided you with training and/or check rides to help you deal 
with white-out conditions? (MV=2)
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a. White-out conditions (MV=65) 83 6 39 70
Skip to Question A 22 
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b. Low visibility conditions?(don't know=1;  
    MV=64) 82 7 21 88
c. Flat light conditions? (MV=64) 83 7 39 70
d. Recovery from inadvertent flight into IMC?  
(MV=66) 77 8 27 85
A24. How confident are you that you can safely fly under Visual Flight Rules in low 
visibility conditions? Are you very confident, somewhat confident, or not 
confident? 
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a. Low visibility 210 40 5 8
b. Flat-light conditions 185 51 16 11
c. White-out conditions  
(Don't know = 1) 164 44 43 11
A25. What survival training have you received from your current employer?  
Training received = 179; None/No training received=21; MV=63 
A26. From the list of resources I am going to read, which ones do you use when 
making the decision to launch a flight?  (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY) 
Flight Service Station  
Yes=236; No=26; MV=1 
National Weather Service  
Yes=220; No=42; MV=1 
Station Manager or other company 
personnel at destination(s) 
Yes=206; No=56; MV=1 
Dispatcher, flight follower, other 
company personnel at hub or 
headquarters Yes=220; No=42; 
MV=1
AWOS/ ASOS Yes=232; No=30, MV=1 
Pilots who are in route or who have 
flown the route that day  
Yes=229; No=4; MV=30 
Other (please specify) (see list below)
Yes = 69; No = 193; MV = 1
Agents in villages, All available, Auto Advisory Frequency, Aviation weather, 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and more, Boats/ships, Call 
destinations, Capstone weather feature, Chief Pilot, Company wind charts, 
Community people you know, Company policies, Current weather/forecasts, 
Customers in field, Destination weather, Direct User Access Terminal, Federal 
Aviation Administration website, General observations, International weather 
package provided, Internet, Internet cameras, Internet weather information, 
Internet/Marine weather, Juneau 800 weather number, Local people, Look out my 
window, Marine weather station, National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
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Administration, Observers in villages, Others along the way, Others at destination, 
People around state, People at destination, People in field, Personal observation, 
Phone people in field, Pilot judgment of conditions, Pilot observation, Radar, 
Remote weather observations, Sparrvon Village, Station personnel, Unofficial 
weather observer, Video cameras, Visual observation, Weather cameras, Web 
cameras, Weather printout. 
A27. If you refuse to launch a flight due to marginal weather, how likely is it that your 
passengers will fly with a different company? Is it not at all likely, somewhat 
likely, or very likely?
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a. Your passengers will fly with a different 
company? MV = 2 142 65 20   7   27 
b. The Post Office will give bypass mail to 
another company? MV = 3   73 15   9 23 140
c. Some other pilot will comment that they 
could have completed the flight? 
Refused= 1; MV =3
155 35 10 20   39 
A28. Compared to other jobs, how safe is your pilot job? Is it much safer than other 
jobs, slightly safer, as safe as other jobs, slightly more dangerous, or much more 
dangerous than other jobs? (Don't know= 1; MV = 4) 
 Much safer than other jobs:  17  Slightly more dangerous than other jobs:  91
 Slightly safer than other jobs:  26  Much more dangerous than other jobs:  16
 As safe as other jobs:  108
A29. Do you have any accidents or incidents on your record? (MV=3)
 No:  205  Yes:  55
A30. Now I'm going to read some different types of avionics, and I would like you to 
tell me how helpful you think each is in preventing crashes? How helpful is the 
auto pilot? Is it very helpful, somewhat helpful, or not helpful? (MARK ONE 
ANSWER FOR EACH) 
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a. Auto pilot   68   88   50 22 35
b. Very High Frequency Omni-
directional Range   70 128   41   3 21
c. Global Positioning System – Visual  
    Flight Rules 211   31   11   3   7 
d. Global Positioning System –  
    Instrument Flight Rules 128   61   19 18 37
e. Long Range Navigation    6   49 136 35 37
f. Mid-air collision avoidance system 117   45   25 33 43
g. Other avionics (No other avionics 
mentioned = 56) -- see list below -- 148   23    2 34
Automatic Direction Finder (ADF); Automatic Direction Finder transponder; 
Automatic Direction Finder, radar altimeter, radar; Automatic Direction Finder, 
Transponder; Automatic Direction Finder/Non-directional Beacon (NDB); 
Automatic Direction Finder/Very High Frequency; Automatic Direction Finder-
Direction Finder-radar; Automatic Direction Finder-Satellite phone; Automatic 
Direction Finder-weather-radar-mapping feature; Air cell phone; Capstone; Data 
link/moving map; District Measuring Equipment (DME); District Measuring 
Equipment localizer; District Measuring Equipment-Automatic Direction Finder; 
Double all avionics; Dual Global Positioning System/Communications; Dual Very 
High Frequency; Early Warning Systems; Electric Flight Instrument System 
(EFIS); Electric Flight Instrument System-Radar Terrain System; Electric Flight 
Instrument System; Flight Management System, Terrain Awareness and Warning 
System (TAWS); Global Positioning System (GPS); Ground Proximity Box; Hand-
held Global Positioning System; Handheld Global Positioning System; High-
frequency radio; Horizontal Situation Indicators (HSI), Global Positioning System 
moving map; Illuminator-Radio altimeter, Maximum Working voltage; Marine 
meter; Marine band Very High Frequency (VHS); Marine VHF radio; Missing 
answer; Moving 3D map; Non-Directional Beacon (NDB); NDB-Automatic 
Direction Finder; Personal Locator Beacon; Programmable VHF; Radar-weather; 
Radar; Radar altimeter; Graphical Weather Systems; Radar illuminator; Radio; 
Radios; Radio Magnetic Indicator-Flight Director, Moving map; Satellite phone; 
Satellite phone, flight director; Satellite phone, GPS; Satellite phone, hand-held 
GPS; Standard communications equipment; Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance 
System (TCAS); Terrain map, Capstone MX20; Traffic alert and Collision Aviation 
System, ground surveillance; Transponder; Transponder, Satellite phone; 
Transponder-Automatic Direction Finder; Very High Frequency Aviation 
Transmission/Marine Transmission; Very High Frequency radio; Wing leveler; 
Weather radar/radio altimeter. 
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A31. I would like to ask your opinion about measures that might improve aviation 
safety for all pilots in Alaska. 
Can you tell me how effective pilot training improvements in meteorology could 
be in preventing aircraft crashes if widely applied in Alaska aviation? Would it be 
very effective, somewhat effective, or not effective?   
Possible measures to use in preventing aircraft crashes 
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Pilot training improvements in the following areas:
a. Pilot training improvements in meteorology (MV = 5) 144 93 19 2
b. Pilot training improvements in decision-making (MV = 5) 192 55 10 1
c. Pilot training improvements in white-out/flat-light 
conditions (MV = 6) 185 59 12 1
d. Pilot training improvements in regional hazards (MV = 5) 206 44   7 1
Now I'm going to ask about company policy and procedures, would company 
policies that included written criteria for Go/No Go decisions be very effective, 
somewhat effective, or not effective in preventing aircraft crashes?  
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Company policies and procedures
e. Written criteria for go/no-go decisions (MV = 7)   89 121 45 1
f. Rewards from management for flights or flight hours 
without accidents/incidents (MV = 7)   59 137 59 1
g. Pay based on salary rather than flight hours or flights
(MV = 8) 100 125 28 2
h. More flight time required of new pilots (MV = 7) 107 105 42 2
i. Better checks of a pilot’s flying history before hiring
   (MV = 7) 53 135 67 1
Now thinking about the weather, would more locations with manned weather 
reporting be very effective, somewhat effective, or not effective in preventing 
aircraft crashes?  
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Weather
j. More locations with manned weather reporting (MV = 6) 210   41   6
k. More locations with automated weather reporting (MV = 6) 186   59 12
l. Increased accuracy of existing weather reporting (MV = 6) 201   50   6
m. Increased and improved use of video cameras, such as 
mountain pass cameras (MV = 7) 197   40 16   3
n. Improved passenger understanding of weather hazards 
(MV = 6)   47 120 90
I'll move on now to operating environments for companies like yours. Would 
changes in how by-pass mail is given to operators be very effective, somewhat 
effective, or not effective in preventing aircraft crashes?   
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Operating Environment
o. Changes in how by-pass mail is given to operators  
(MV = 41) 19   74 119 10
p. More time to deliver by-pass mail before it’s switched to 
another operator (MV = 44) 22   82 106   9 
q. Financial incentives (e.g., lower insurance rates, preference 
in mail contracts) for flights or flight hours without 
accidents/incidents (MV = 18)
54 109   80   2 
A32. Thinking of those 17 measures you just rated, if you had to choose only two as 
most useful, which would they be?   
 Most frequent selections:
1. a31b=80; a31d=41; a31j=39; a31a=35 
2. a31j=75; a31h=21; a31k=21; a31m=20; a31l=19 
A33. If there are other measures that you believe might improve aviation safety 
in Alaska, but which we didn't discuss in the previous question, can you tell 
me what they are? Comments included=176; None/NA=84, MV=3 
34. Do you have any other comments you would like to add about aviation safety in 
Alaska? Comments included=177; MV=86 
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Capstone Pilot Module Screening
Have you ever flown Capstone equipped aircraft for your company? 
 No  Î Thank you.  You do not need to complete the Capstone module. 
 Yes Î   [Please turn page and continue.] 
Thank you for your time.  All of the information you have provided is confidential 
and cannot be used for enforcement purposes.
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Additional Resources
Appendix C
Contact information is provided for three of the programs which promote safety in 
Alaska’s commercial aviation Community.
Capstone Program
http://www.alaska.faa.gov/capstone/Index.htm
Capstone Program Office
Sue Gardner, Program Manager
801 B Street, Suite 300
Anchorage, Alaska 99501
Phone: (907) 271-1338
Federal Aviation Administration’s Circle of Safety
http://www.alaska.faa.gov
U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration
Office of Community Relations
222 West Seventh Avenue
Anchorage, Alaska 99513-7587
Phone: (907) 270-5296
Medallion Foundation
http://medallionfoundation.org
2301 Merrill Field Drive, Suite A3
Anchorage, AK 99501
Phone: (907) 222-3210
Fax: (907) 222-3206
Delivering on the Nation’s promise:
Safety and health at work for all people
through research and prevention
To receive documents or more information about occupational safety 
 and health topics, contact NIOSH at
Telephone: 1-800-35-NIOSH
Fax: 513-533-8573
E-mail: pubstaft@cdc.gov
or visit the NIOSH Web site at www.cdc.gov/niosh
DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2007-102
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